The Joint Determinants of Managerial Ownership, Board Independence, and Firm Performance

摘要：

We specify a simple structural model of the firm to isolate the economic determinants of key aspects of organization form in a value-maximizing contracting environment. Optimal firm size, managerial ownership, and board independence are jointly determined by exogenous parameters defining the productivity of physical assets, managerial input, inside director expertise, and outside director advising and monitoring. The model provides an equilibrium explanation for the cross-sectional relationships among managerial ownership, board structure, and firm performance observed in data. Using the model for policy analysis, our approach also explains the observed changes in compensation structure following new requirements for board independence.

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: Third Shanghai Winter Finance Conference(第三届上海冬季金融研讨会)

会议地点: 上海

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-47

在线出版日期: 2010-12-18（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）