Study on supply chain revenue allocation with bilateral asymmetry information

摘要：

Information asymmetry and the revenue allocation are still key problems influencing the supply chain coordination and the relationship between the upstream and downstream. An incentive model is established in this paper by introducing a virtual third party as a coordinating body and considering the supply chain coordination as a special one-to-many principal-agent problem. The connection between the supply chain profits and the proportion of revenue allocation and the cost distribution function is got. The results show that the greater the likelihood of high cost, the smaller the proportion of revenue allocation; however, in the case of the same prior cost distribution, the higher cost manufacturer (vendor) gets greater proportion of revenue allocation.

作者: Hongmei Guo Hong Cheng Xianyu Wang

作者单位: Business School Sichuan University Chengdu, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 4th Conference on System Science,Management Science & System Dynamics(第四届系统科学、管理科学&系统动力学国际会议)

会议地点: 上海

会议语种:英文

页码: 273-277

在线出版日期: 2010-12-10（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）