Reverse Logistics Outsourcing Mechanism Research Based on Principal-Agent Theory

摘要：

Operating reverse logistics in enterprise better or not is directly related to customers’ satisfaction and loyalty. Therefore, many enterprises usually adopt a policy to outsource their reverse logistics in order to strengthen their competence in the market. How to design an incentive mechanism is a key problem in reverse logistics outsourcing management. Through the reputation effects model pursued by the agent and the ratchet effects model caused by the principal increasing the standard, the reverse logistics outsourcing mechanism is analyzed, and a relative performance contrast is put forward to weaken the ratchet effects to design the incentive mechanism which can get two-win between the principal and the agent.

作者: Wang Haiyan Tu Min

作者单位: School of Transportation,Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan,P.R.China,430063

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The 7th International Conference on Innovation and Management(第七届创新与管理国际会议 ICIM 2010)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 390-393

在线出版日期: 2010-12-04（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）