An UWB Ranging-based Localization Strategy with Internal Attack Immunity
The two-way ranging (TWR) protocol has been adopted in the IEEE 802.15.4a standard for wireless networks. However, it is vulnerable to malicious attacks (e.g., internal attacks). An internal ranging attack here refers to a fraudulent timestamp report. For example, a compromised sensor node tampers its timestamp report to spoof its processing time in order to malignly decrease or enlarge distance measurements, or a sensor node submits an inaccurate timestamp report due to the clock drift. In this paper, we propose an UWB ranging-based localization strategy, which is immune to the internal ranging attack. Regardless of the honesty of the timestamp report from a sensor node, we could still estimate the position of the sensor node accurately. We show how to defeat a ranging attack by taking it into account in the development of a localization algorithm.
Yiyin Wang Xiaoli Ma Geert Leus
Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Delft University of Technology Mekelweg 4, 2628CD Delft, The Neth School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology Atlanta, GA 30332-025 Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Delft University of Technology Mekelweg 4, 2628CD Delft, The Neth
国际会议
南京
英文
1-4
2010-09-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）