Dynamic Pricing Decision in the Two-echelon Supply Chain with Manufacturers Advertising and Dominant Retailer
In a two-echelon supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer, the dominant retailer can have a centralized control of the supply chain, or is the leader in Stackelberg game in decentralized supply chain, and can coordinate the entire supply chain by controling or influencing the manufacturers wholesale price. Especially, the manufacturer can increase sales with advertisement, the retail price and advertising not only influence on the current market demand, but also the next period demand. Based on the above, the equilibrium of a two-period dynamic pricing and advertising model is given by a backward induction in decentralized supply chain and centralized supply chain, and the influence of price sensitive coefficient and advertising sensitive coefficient on decision is analyzed. Furthermore, the conditions of supply chain coordination by the wholesale price are gived, some new conclusions are drawn. The results show that the next period decisions lie much on the current period decisions.
Retailer dominating Two-echelon supply chain Advertising Pricing Dynamic Coordination
Fangxu Ren
School of Economics and Management
国际会议
2011 China Control and Decision Conference(2011中国控制与决策会议 CCDC)
四川绵阳
英文
391-395
2011-05-23（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）