Bidding Strategies in Sealed-Bid Reverse Multi-attribute Auctions
This study considers the reverse multi-attribute, or procurement auction in which the item for sale is defined by several quality attributes in addition to the price, the buyer is the auctioneer, and the sellers are the bidders. We focus on a variation of the first-price sealed-bid protocol termed first-score sealed-bid auction. We analyze a specific model for the protocol, and we provide optimal strategies for both the auctioneer and the bidders participating in the auctions. In addition, we conclude that the auctioneer can manipulate the auction to yield better outcome, however, as the number of the bidders participating in the auction increases, the buyer is motivated to announce a real utility function.
Multi-attribute Auctions Electronic Procurement Reverse Auctions
HONG Zong-you Wang Ding-wei
Northeastern University, Shenyang, 110006, China;Shenyang University of Chemical Technology, Shenyan Institute of Systems Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang, 110006, China
国际会议
2011 China Control and Decision Conference(2011中国控制与决策会议 CCDC)
四川绵阳
英文
1762-1767
2011-05-23（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）