Research on Decision of Cyber Security Investment Based on Evolutionary Game Model

摘要：

During the cyber security construction process, how to set proper security standard and investment quota in accordance with the important degree of its information is a universal problem of enterprises. We propose a dynamic Invest-Attack Model based on Information Asymmetry between the protectors and attackers of cyber security and make RD analysis to the proposed model with Evolutionary Game Theory. Finally, we analyze motivation of decision making of players of both sides from microcosmic perspective and put forward conclusion as well as policy suggestions.

关键词： cyber security investment Information Asymmetry Evolutionary Game Theory

作者: Rong Pan Changxin Xu

作者单位: Business School Hohai University Nanjing, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2010年IEEE多媒体信息网络与安全国际会议

会议地点: 南京

会议语种:英文

页码: 491-495

在线出版日期: 2010-11-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）