Dynamic Pricing with Strategic and Myopic Consumers
This paper develops a model of two-period pricing problem when the customer pool consists of strategic types and myopic types and customer valuations are stochastic. We divide the customers into some groups and use the bottom valuation of a certain group to describe its responsive behavior to the seller’s pricing strategy. By solving a two-stage dynamic programming problem,we provide the optimal price policy for the seller. The numerical example shows that with increase of the proportion of strategic customers,the markdown extent reduces,the total expected number of customers who purchase becomes smaller,and the total expected profit drops. We also discuss two special cases,in which the customers are exclusively myopic or they are exclusively strategic.
pricing strategic customer myopic customer dynamic programming
Hui Yang Huaming Song Song Zhang
School of Economics and Management Nanjing University of Science and Technology Nanjing,210094,China Development Planning Office Nanjing Agricultural University Nanjing,210095,China
国际会议
香港
英文
104-108
2010-08-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）