Model of Traffic Path Choice based on Game Theory and Induction Mechanism
In a traffic system, drivers will always choose paths to maximize their own travel utilities, while in the other side, the system manager endeavors to minimize the overall travel time and reach the most system efficiency. In this paper, an induction mechanism based on game theory is proposed. According to the real traffic data, the manager publishes corrected traffic information initially, and then drivers choose their paths. Both the induction of the manager and the choosing of drivers are fulfilled before drivers enter into the traffic system, which can avoid the congestion drift intrinsically. Behaviors of the manager and drivers are guided by game theory. While achieving Nash equilibrium, both the utilities of both the system and drivers are increased observably. Then, the fact that there is a room for inducing challenges is concluded.
path choice induction mechanism traffic simulation congestion drift
Dongwei GUO Xinquan LI Miao LIU Liming ZHANG
College of Computer Science and Technology Jilin University Chang Chun, Jilin, China
国际会议
电子商务、工程及科学领域的分布计算和应用国际会议(DCABES 2010)
香港
英文
495-498
2010-08-10（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）