Quality Signaling through Warranty & Brand Reputation

摘要：

When product quality is unobservable to consumers, a manufacturer can convey quality information using signals such as warranty and brand reputation. The purpose of this paper is to study the interaction between warranty, brand reputation, and product quality, and to examine alternative quality-signaling strategies. We model a monopolist who conveys unobservable product quality through signals of warranty and brand reputation. Heterogeneous consumers perceive the signals, form quality beliefs, and make purchase decisions. Consumers also update brand reputation perceptions after product consumptions. Under this framework, we study the monopolist’s optimal decisions of price, warranty, and quality in a one-period model.

作者: Kunpeng Li Dilip Chhajed Suman Mallik

作者单位: Management & Marketing Department, Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX 77340 USA Department of Business Administration,University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL 6182 School of Business, University of Kansas,Lawrence, KS 66045 USA

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2010 IEEE International Conference on Service Operations and Logistics,and Informations(2010 IEEE 服务、运筹、物流与信息化国际研讨会)

会议地点: 青岛

会议语种:英文

页码: 7-10

在线出版日期: 2010-07-15（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）