Re.nement of Symmetrical Nash Equilibrium for Generalized Second-price Mechanism in Sponsored Search Advertising
Sponsored search advertising is the most prevailing online advertising instrument, also it is the most important and fastest-growing revenue source for auctioneers. In this paper, we propose a new type of equilibrium re.nement concept named “stable Nash equilibriu for this auction game. We illustrate that the set of all stable Nash equilibria (STNE) of a GSP mechanism keyword auction can be ef.ciently calculated by a recursive procedure. STNE is either the same as the set of the well-known symmetrical Nash equilibrium or a proper subset of it. These findings free both auctioneers and advertisers from complicated strategic thinking. The revenue of a GSP auction on STNE is at least the same as that of the classical VCG mechanism and can be used as a benchmark for evaluating other mechanisms. At the same time, STNE provides advertisers a simple yet effective and stable strategy.
Linjing Li Daniel Zeng
Key Laboratory of Complex Systems and Intelligence Science, Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy Key Laboratory of Complex Systems and Intelligence Science, Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy
国际会议
青岛
英文
457-462
2010-07-15（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）