An Evolution Game Model for Moral Hazards in Supply Chain Evolving

摘要：

The characters of occuming，interacting，transferring for moral hazards in supply chain are analyzed,which is interpreted by an evolution game model constructed for moral hazards evolution,then the attractors for all perhaps behaviors can be calculated for mastering the evolution law about moral hazards in supply．Furthermore，the specialization，diversity and self-organization for moral hazards with behavior being collected in the process of supply chain operation can be analyzed，which makes moral hazards in supply chain complexity and adaptable．

关键词： moral hazards evolution law equilibrium attractors

作者: XU Xusong ZHENG Xiaojing WANG Yan

作者单位: Economics and Management School,Wuhan University,Wuhan P.R.China 430072 Economics and Management School,Wuhan University,Wuhan，P.R.China,430072,School of Management,Harbin Commerce Department,Harbin Huaxia Institute of Computer Technology,Harbin,P.R.China,150025

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The First International Conference on Complexity Science Management(2010 计算机与软件建模国际会议 ICCSM2010)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 126-130

在线出版日期: 2010-10-22（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）