Principal-agent Analyses of High-end Shipping Services Supply Chain
With the globalization of the world economy, relationship of shipping service enterprises in a high-end shipping service supply chain is more and more closely. In high-end shipping service supply chain, the parties asymmetric information will lead to the principal-agent problem. Because of the incentive incompatibilities and supervision lackness, the principal-agent relationship between node enterprises in the high-end shipping service supply chain becomes ineffective, which leads to the failure of high-end shipping service contract. This paper analyzed the agency problems of high-end shipping supply chain with multitask principal-agent model, discussed how to design an effective incentive and restraint mechanisms in principal-agent relationships to realize high shipping services supply chain utility maximization.
high-end shipping services supply chain principal-agent relationship
CHEN Hui-huang
China Executive Leadership Academy Pudong Shanghai 201204, China
国际会议
北京
英文
887-890
2011-08-08（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）