Analysis on Game of Anti-collusion of Insurance Fraud and the Optimal Check Cost

摘要：

This paper used game analysis method to construct the tripartite incomplete information game model between policy-holder, Insurance agent company and insurance company. It studied the Nash equilibrium of insurance fraud game. Through the analysis, this paper concluded that insurance companies can effectively prevent conspiracy between the insurance agent and policy-holder by severe penalty. At the same time it solved the insurance companys and the Nash equilibrium of the games mixed strategy.

关键词： Nash equilibrium Insurance fraud Check cost Preventing collusion equilibrium

作者: CHANG Chunhua LI Jing

作者单位: School of Economy, Yangtzeu University, China, 434025

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The 3rd (2011) International Conference on Financial Risk and Corporate Finance Management(第三届(2011)金融风险与公司金融国际研讨会FRCFM 2011)

会议地点: 大连

会议语种:英文

页码: 242-249

在线出版日期: 2011-06-30（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）