DOUBLE MORAL HAZARD IN SUPPLY CHAIN BASED ON OVERCONFIDENCE BIAS

摘要：

Based on principal-agent theory, this paper introduces default compensation and default tendency into primary contact between manufacturers and overconfident suppliers in a supply chain. We present the impact of default compensation and suppliers overconfidence level on decisions of both sides under double moral hazard condition. The conclusions suggest that the default compensation in primary contract can effectively decrease the manufacturers’ default tendency, motivate suppliers to work hard, and thus decrease double moral hazard on both sides. Though overconfidence can boost suppliers’ efforts, and cooperating with an overconfident supplier can reduce the agency costs, overconfidence may cause fluctuations in market, which is why relative policies should be made to guide and control the overconfidence level.

关键词： Overconfidence Supply chain Default compensation Default tendency Double moral hazard

作者: Wanglin Kang Xinmin Liu Zhipeng Li

作者单位: College of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology 579 Qianwangang R College of Information and Electrical Engineering, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qi

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 1st International Conference on Logistics,Informatics and Service Science(2011物流、信息化与服务科学国际会议 LISS 2011)

会议地点: 北京

会议语种:英文

页码: 500-503

在线出版日期: 2011-06-08（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）