INVESTOR-MANAGER HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS AND CORPORATE FINANCING DECISION
This paper considers a firm that may issue common stock or debt to undertake an investment opportunity when the investors and the manager have different estimates of the expected return from the investment. Firstly, an equilibrium model is developed to reveal the impact of investor-manager heterogeneous beliefs on corporate financing decision, and the model concludes that the greater the investors belief relative to the manager, the more likely the firm is to choose to issue equity rather than debt. Secondly, using a sample of debt and seasoned equity issues from Chinese listed firms we empirically analyze the conclusion above. We find empirical results support for the conclusion.
Investor-Manager Heterogeneous belief Financing decision
Jian Ma Zhixin Liu
School of Economic and Management, BeiHang University, Beijing, China
国际会议
13th International Conference on Enterprise Information System(第13届企业信息系统国际会议 ICEIS 2011)
北京
英文
971-975
2011-06-08(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)