STUDY ON THE LONG-TERM INCENTIVE MECHANISM OF THE LARGE-SCALE DREDGING PROJECT

摘要：

Through the principal-agent theory and game theory, this article has established the long-term income model of the large-scale dredging project, which has obtained the solution of the long-term incentive model, analyzed the impact of the dynamic consistency as well as pledge and negotiating cost to incomes of the principal and agent by means of increasing different constraint conditions. Furthermore, the study also shows that the long-term incentive model can provide the agent with stronger incentive.

关键词： Dredging project Principal-agent Long-term income Incentive mechanism

作者: Bin Zhou Zigang Zhang

作者单位: Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, Hubei Province, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 13th International Conference on Enterprise Information System(第13届企业信息系统国际会议 ICEIS 2011)

会议地点: 北京

会议语种:英文

页码: 1150-1156

在线出版日期: 2011-06-08（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）