The evolution of indirect reciprocity based on ternary image
Indirect reciprocity, as an important branch of evolutionary game dynamics, has received much recent attention. Previous studies have proved that indirectly reciprocal cooperation can be established based on binary image. In this study, we define the reputation criterion for ternary image: good (G), bad (B) and medium (M), and specifically examine the evolutionary dynamics for indirect reciprocity under ternary image. The results reveal that indirectly reciprocal cooperation can be formed and maintained stably.
indirect reciprocity ternary image reputation criterion prisoner’s dilemma game
Lu Liu Xinsheng Liu
国际会议
The 5th International Congress on Mathematical Biology(第五届国际生物数学大会 ICMB 2011)
南京
英文
497-503
2011-06-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）