The Option Game Model and Its Development of R&D Investment

摘要：

Smit and Trigeorgis (1997, 2003) have had the biggest contribution to this kind of R&D investment model. Huisman and Kort (1998,1999) have developed the standard option game model under symmetric duopoly. They extend the thought of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) on solving the equilibrium of the model and analytical framework of Stenbacka and Tombak (1994) on modeling the characteristics of technology. This paper first analyzes the option game model of R&D, inquiries into this model approach under technology adoption, patent competition, and considering asymmetric information and stochastic collusion, displays the development history and thought point of option game theory about R&D.

关键词： R&D investment option game technology adoption

作者: yuling Liao qianlin Hong

作者单位: Business School, Central South University Changsha, China The School of Economics, Sichuan University Chengdu, china

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The Fourth International Joint Conference on Computational Science and Optimization(第四届计算科学与优化国际大会 CSO 2011)

会议地点: 昆明、丽江

会议语种:英文

页码: 497-501

在线出版日期: 2011-04-15（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）