Incentive mechanism to prevent moral hazards in VMI

摘要：

This text analyzes the moral hazard problem and the reasons leading to it in VMI,then establishes the incentive mechanism model between the supplier and the retailer using the Principal-agent Theory in the supposition that the supplier is risk-neutral and the retailer is risk-averse.At last the incentive mechanism model shows the value of the incentive compensation coefficient provided by the supplier and the effort level of the retailer,which could prevent moral hazards in VMI effectively.

关键词： VMI moral hazards incentive mechanism

作者: Jingmin Zhang Guizhi Wang

作者单位: Department of Logistics Management,Beijing Technology and Business University,Beijing,100048,China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The Fourth International Joint Conference on Computational Science and Optimization(第四届计算科学与优化国际大会 CSO 2011)

会议地点: 昆明、丽江

会议语种:英文

页码: 557-560

在线出版日期: 2011-04-15（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）