An Incomplete and Dynamic Game Analysis On Behavior between the Owner and Entrepreneur

摘要：

To explain the reason and the condition under which the owner has the motion to pretend or expose his real type of psychological contract,a dynamic game model is constructed in this article, given that entrepreneurs psychological contract is the common knowledge but that of the owners is private.The findings show that the owner is possible to reveal his real type when disguise cost is larger than half of the regained loss as conscientious entrepreneur come to his senses.

关键词： Game theory Relational psychological conlract Transactional psychological contract

作者: Li Zhou

作者单位: Research Center of the Economy of the upper Reaches of Yangtze River,Graduate Education Affairs Office,Chongqing Technology and Business University Chongqing,China,400067.

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The Fourth International Joint Conference on Computational Science and Optimization(第四届计算科学与优化国际大会 CSO 2011)

会议地点: 昆明、丽江

会议语种:英文

页码: 677-680

在线出版日期: 2011-04-15（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）