Evolutionary Game Analysis of Enterprises Behavior of Carbon Reduction

摘要：

Low-carbon society results from the behaviors of carbon reduction that all the companies take in the long time. This paper proposes the enterprises evolutionary model of behavior on carbon emission and studies its evolutionary path. The results show that the evolutionary result of behavior on carbon emission depends on the initial status, assets return and the return on emission rights, and the essential difference between the institution that enforces the enterprises to join in the market on emission rights and the one in which whether to join depends the companies willings is that the former needs the rate of return on investment in carbon reduction.

关键词： carbon reduction carbon emission permits market emission permits evolutionary game

作者: Guoxing Zhang Peng Liu Jianpeng Zhou

作者单位: School of Management, Lanzhou University, 730000 Lanzhou, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The Fourth International Joint Conference on Computational Science and Optimization(第四届计算科学与优化国际大会 CSO 2011)

会议地点: 昆明、丽江

会议语种:英文

页码: 1113-1116

在线出版日期: 2011-04-15（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）