Non-cooperative Game Analysis of the Issue of Strategies in Benefits Distribution in Collaborative Transportation
There is an gaining process in the interest distribution in collaborative transportation, Rubinsteins bargaining model takes the discount factor into account for the game of the interest distribution. Sub-game perfect equilibrium is an tool to analyse the strategies in benefits distribution in collaborative transportation, the transaction status and discount factor are linked together. Result shows that the discount factor is the impact factor of the proceeds of the parties involved in cooperative relations, and who first proposed interest share contract will get advantage. It also proved that equilibrium relationship in cooperative could be forecast. The discount factor analysis can effectively solve the interest distribution in collaborative transportation refer to the issue of strategies in benefits distribution.
collaborative transport the distribution of benefits Non-cooperative game bargaining model discount factor strategies
Haoxiong Yang Caiying Shang Yongsheng Zhou Hao Zhang
Department of Logistics Management, School of Business Beijing Technology and Business University Beijing, China
国际会议
昆明、丽江
英文
1187-1190
2011-04-15（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）