Diversification and Managerial Incentives——Evidences From Chinese listed firms
This paper makes an empirical test on the relationship between diversification and managerial incentive. The result shows that cash compensation negatively to firm value. The relationship between stock ownership by managers and diversification is non-liner. Compensation has not important influence on firm value. Diversification is insignificant related to firm value. When controlling the specific factors of firm, we find that the level of diversification is positively related to managers in firms where state owner is dominant. The level of diversification is negatively related to cash payment, but positively related to stock ownership. The level of diversification is positively to nonpecuniary compensation. Managers diversify their firms in order to get more residual income and private benefit
firm value diversification managerial incentives agency cost of shareholder
Shao Jun Chai Qingfu
Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce Shanghai China 201620
国际会议
秦皇岛
英文
40-44
2010-11-05（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）