Key Substitution Attacks on Two Short Signature Schemes from Bilinear Pairings
In 2009, S. Akleylek et al. and R. Tso et al. proposed two efficient short signature schemes from bilinear pairings separately. In this paper, we propose the key substitution attacks on the two short signature schemes. Our attacks show that the malicious attacker can generate a valid signature, which can be verified by a forged public key, from a legitimate users public key and a signature on some message m. Therefore, S. Akleylek et al.s scheme and R. Tso et al.s scheme are insecure against the key substitution attack.
short signature scheme bilinear pairings elliptic curves key substitution attack information security
Fanyu Kong Jia Yu
Institute of Network Security Shandong University Jinan 250100 China College of Information Engineering Qingdao University Qingdao 266071 China
国际会议
秦皇岛
英文
262-264
2010-11-05(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)