Key Substitution Attack on an Improved Short Signature Scheme without Random Oracles
Recently, M. Zhang et al. proposed a forgery attack and a key substitution attack on F. Zhang et al.s short signature scheme without random oracles - the ZCSM scheme. They also presented an improved signature scheme to defeat the key substitution attack. In this paper, we firstly show that M. Zhang et al.s forgery attack on the ZCSM scheme is incorrect. Secondly, we prove that M. Zhang et al.s improved short signature scheme still suffers from the key substitution attack.
Key substitution attack Short signature scheme Bilinear pairings Standard model Random oracle model
Fanyu Kong Jia Yu
Institute of Network Security, Shandong University,Jinan 250100, China College of Information Engineering, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China
国际会议
2010 Second Asia-Pacific Conference on Information Processing(2010年第二届亚太地区信息处理国际会议 APCIP 2010)
南昌
英文
288-291
2010-09-17(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)