Analysis of Product Warranties With Screening And Signaling

摘要：

Warranty is an important element of marketing products as better warranty signals higher product quality and provides greater profit to manufacturers. These two uses of warranties are screening and signaling. Based on the game of product warranty between seller and buyer, optimal contracts of screening when quality is observable and optimal contracts of signaling when quality is unobservable are analyzed, and the law of product warranty for screening and signaling is disclosed.

关键词： product warranties screening signaling optimal contract

作者: WANG Haiyan SUN Shulei

作者单位: School of Management Engineering,Nanjing University of Finance and Economics,Nanjing,P.R.China,21004 School of Management Engineering,Nanjing University of Finance and Economics,Nanjing,P.R.China, 2100

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2010 International Conference on Management(2010管理国际大会)

会议地点: 上海

会议语种:英文

页码: 109-112

在线出版日期: 2010-07-24（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）