Intellectual Property Right Protection And Strategic R&D Subsidy: From A Developing Countrys View
This paper investigates the competition of technology and production between the North (developed country) and the South (developing country), and how such competition may be affected by the international IPR protection level and the Souths R &. D subsidy. Contributions of this paper are; firstly, it analyzes strategic relationships of IPR protection, R&D incentives and subsidy policies from a developing countrys view, and find that the optimal subsidy rate of the South is non-monotonic with the international IPR protection due to various R&D efficiencies of firms. Secondly, this paper explores the double-edged effects of subsidy policies, and points out that the Souths government should balance the innovation incentives and the welfare improvement when offering subsidies. Thirdly, this paper examines the welfare effects of the Norths IPR protection and the Souths subsidies. It argued that a tighter international IPR protection has ambiguous effects on the Norths welfare when the South has secondary innovation. If the North firstly decides the optimal IPR protection level, the Souths government offering subsidy to low R &- D efficiency firms would benefit the Norths welfare.
intellectual property right protection (IPR protection) strategic R & D subsidy R & D efficiency North-south trade
LI Keke REN Jianxin
School of Business Management, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan, P. R. China, 430073
国际会议
2010 International Conference on Management(2010管理国际大会)
上海
英文
119-126
2010-07-24（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）