A Research of Food Supply Chain Disruption Prevention Based on Master-slave Supervision Game Model
In recent years, food emergencies happened frequently, and food problems cover almost all kinds of food. The food emergencies not only led to the bankrupt of food enterprises, but also caused serious panic in society. However, from a deep study of food emergencies in recent years, most food emergencies came from food quality dishonest behaviors in the process of food production, delivery and sale. So strengthening the supervision of cheating behaviors is a necessary way to prevent food emergencies. This paper sets up a game model about food quality behaviors in a food supply chain which contains one core enterprise and a few cooperators, and the core enterprise play a dominant role in the food supply chain and the cooperators acts as subordinate roles. In order to ensure the food safety and reduce the risk, the core enterprise often inclines to supervises the cooperators food quality by the ways of cheating behaviors detecting and severe punishment of cheating behaviors. This paper studies effect of the two supervision ways implemented by core enterprise, and also contrasts their effects in prevention food emergencies.
Food emergencies Food supply chain Risk Game model
Xiao Kaihong Dong Qianli Xu Lei
School of Economics and Management Chang An University, Xian, P.R.China, 710064 School of Manageme School of Economics and Management Changan University Xian, P.R China, 710064 School of Economics and Management Changan University Xian, P.RChina, 710064
国际会议
成都
英文
320-323
2010-06-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）