Optimal Pricing of A Two-echelon Distribution System Considering Retailers Different Competitive Behaviors
This paper considers the pricing and quantity decisions of a two-echelon system consisting of one manufacturer and two retailers under their different competitive behavior—Cournot, Collusion and Stackelberg. The sensitivity of the retail quantity to the wholesale price of the manufacturer and the sale prices of the retailers is fully considered. A novel retailers profit model is developed. Then a simple algorithm is provided to find the optimal sale prices, associated retail quantities, and the optimal wholesale prices under the retailers different competitive behavior. Finally, we simulate the system and exploit several numerical experiments to test our algorithm. The experimental results show that our algorithm can wonderfully analyze the two-echelon distribution system.
distribution system pricing competitive behavior
Na Zhao
Business school Zhejiang Wanli University Ningbo,China
国际会议
黄山
英文
121-124
2010-05-28（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）