VAM Applied to PE Investment Based on the Analysis of Game Theory

摘要：

As a risk control tool, Valuation Adjustment Mechanism (VAM) has been widely used in Private Equity (PE) investing in developing firms in recent years. By constructing a game theory model, this paper analyzes the game result of PE investment institutions and the financing enterprise with or without VAM comparatively, with the analytical framework which considers VAM, PE investment institutions and the financing enterprise as a whole. The result reveals that applying VAM to PE investment is not only beneficial to relieve the information asymmetry between investors and financiers, but also plays an important role in motivating the management layer of financing enterprises. This possesses guiding significance for further development of PE funds in China.

关键词： VAM PE investment information asymmetry management incentive

作者: WANG Dan LI Aimin

作者单位: Department of Management Engineering, Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001, China Department of Management Engineering,Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2010 International Conference on Risk and Reliability Management(2010年风险与可靠性管理国际会议RRM 2010)

会议地点: 北京

会议语种:英文

页码: 168-174

在线出版日期: 2010-10-23（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）