Reciprocal Fairness Equilibrium Evaluation in the Game of the Urban Housing Demolition
Urban housing demolition problem involves multi-interests of government, developers, and relocatees. How to coordinate the interests in the process of urban house demolition is a very important theoretical issue in the process of the national urbanization. On the analytical basis of inequity aversion model, this paper constructs the reciprocal fairness evaluation of government and developers, developers and relocatees, government and relocatees and conducts analysis of reciprocal fairness equilibrium between stakeholders. Finally, selecting Changsha Stubborn Nail as a case, it gives a analysis in-depth in the role of reciprocal fairness idea through using relevant data.
urban housing demolition reciprocal fairness equilibrium evaluation
Kai-rong Hong Yu-ling Liao
Business School Central South University Changsha, China
国际会议
太原
英文
117-122
2010-10-22（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）