Moral Hazard Analysis in Cooperation among Industry-University-Research Institute
Cooperation among industry-university-research institute has already become an important form of cooperation innovation. Allies in organization, who have cooperative relationship, burden moral hazard due to information asymmetry. The paper develops a game model on partner selection without signal under information asymmetry and analyzes a signal transmission model which includes the reputation as a signal. This paper draws a conclusion that adverse selection exists in cooperation under information asymmetry, introducing the reputation as a signal can avoid moral hazard and improve the efficiency of the cooperation.
moral hazard game model partner selection
Wang Yuan Xu Yang
Department of economics Huazhong university of science and technology Wuhan, P.R.China Department of econometrics Huazhong university of science and technology Wuhan, P.R.China
国际会议
太原
英文
592-596
2010-10-22（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）