A Network Security Assessment Model Based on Attack-Defense Game Theory
In this paper a network security assessment model based on game theory is presented to evaluate network security and perform active defense. The model uses the game relationship between attacker and defender to formally describe and quantitatively calculate benefits and costs of both sides. By solving mixed Nash equilibrium of the model, we could obtain the knowledge of possible attack paths of attacker and defenders optimizing strategy. In the end, a simple scenario is presented to illustrate the usage of the proposed model in network security assessment. The results indicate that the model and method is effective and efficient.
game theory metwork security attack graph optimal active defense
Baoyi Wang Jianqiang Cai Shaomin Zhang Jun Li
School of Control and Computer Engineering North China Electric Power University Baoding, China
国际会议
太原
英文
639-643
2010-10-22（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）