Analysis on Motivation Mechanism for Agents under Asymmetric Information Condition

摘要：

Design on motivation mechanism for agents is an important problem in management science. The incentive model under asymmetric information condition is discussed through contract theory. The research finds that the effect of incentive is closely related to the agents working ability, the degree of risk averse, uncertainty of the work and endeavor cost. It can be found that the yardstick competition may improve the incentive contract. Finally, some advices about motivation mechanism for agents are given that help agents work hard for principals.

关键词： asymmetric information motivation mechanism contract mathematical model

作者: Xu Yanli LIU Dan

作者单位: School of Management Harbin Normal University Harbin, P.R.China, 150025

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The 2010 International Conference on Computer Application and System Modeling(2010计算机应用与系统建模国际会议 ICCASM 2010)

会议地点: 太原

会议语种:英文

页码: 556-559

在线出版日期: 2010-10-22（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）