Dual-Sourcing Supply Chain Coordination
This paper studies a supplier-retailer chain problem with dual-soucing channels for the retailer:ordering from the supplier and producing by himself.Customers demand is assumed to be linear.We find the buy-back contract can not coordinate our model.A numerical example indicates that the buy-back contract is a better strategy for both the supplier and the retailer than the wholesale price contract,and the suppliers participation increases the retailers expected profit.
dual-soucring supply chain buy-back contract coordination Stackelberg game component
Weigang Zhou Qianqian Feng
The School of Mathematics and Computer Science Xiangfan University Xiangfan,China 441053
国际会议
重庆
英文
36-40
2010-09-17(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)