RETAILER DOMINATED SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION WITH SUPPLIERS FAIRNESS PREFERENCE

摘要：

This paper studies the optimal decisions and profit allocations in a retailer-dominated supply chain when considering the suppliers fairness preference. Under deterministic retail-market demand we analytically derive the retailers optimal decision, suppliers optimal wholesale price as well as their optimal profits. We find that the conclusions under deterministic market demand are substantially different. That is, in retailer-leading supply chain structure, price-only equivalent contract could not achieve the supply chain coordination, whatever taking the suppliers fairness preference into consideration or not. Under stochastic demand, we have numerical analyzed that the retailer dominated supply chain still can not coordinate the supply chain when integrating the fairness of supplier. Furthermore, the fairness preference has no effect on the retail price.

关键词： supply chain coordination retailer-dominant price-only equivalent contract fairness preference

作者: Zhong Yao Limei Wang Xin Wang

作者单位: School of Economics and Management, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The Tneth International Conference on Industrial Management(第十届工业管理国际会议 ICIM 2010)

会议地点: 北京

会议语种:英文

页码: 133-138

在线出版日期: 2010-09-16（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）