THE RESEARCH OF THE GAME EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN RENT-SEEKING AND SUPERVISION IN CONSTRUCTION BIDDING

摘要：

The tender and bidding is a significant part of construction project management. Projects applying tender and bidding have received excellent results in duration, quality and cost control. However, the behaviors of rent-seeking that exist in bidding have severely undermined the fairness of bidding. This paper started with disclosing the relationship between rent-seeking behaviors and supervision acts to analyze the game equilibrium between rent-seeking and supervision by setting up a game model. The paradox of incentives theory was quoted to prove that strengthen requirements for supervision departments is an effective method of reducing rent-seeking probability.

关键词： project bidding game theory mixed-strategy nash equilibrium the paradox of incentives theory

作者: Kangle Li Jingjuan Guo

作者单位: School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 10044, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The Tneth International Conference on Industrial Management(第十届工业管理国际会议 ICIM 2010)

会议地点: 北京

会议语种:英文

页码: 260-263

在线出版日期: 2010-09-16（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）