A Tripartite Game Theoretic Model of Central Government, Local Government and Victims in Emergency Management

摘要：

After carefully analyzing the existing research, this paper examines the relationship between the central government, local government and victims in a large-scale disaster. The study characterizes the optimal state of equilibrium among the players and provides insights into the related institutional arrangement. The final part analyses the merits and shortcomings of the model and presents some concrete proposals for improvement.

关键词： tripartite game model disaster relief emergency management mechanism design

作者: Zhang Haoyu Chen An

作者单位: Graduate University of Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing, China Institute of Policy and Management, Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2010 IEEE International Conference on Emergency Management and Management Sciences(2010 IEEE应急管理与管理科学国际会议 ICEMMS)

会议地点: 北京

会议语种:英文

页码: 461-464

在线出版日期: 2010-08-08（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）