Research on the Subsidy Cheat in the Environmental Protection Industry and its Strategies
Due to the information Asymmetry between the government and firms, many problems have been found in the subsidy policy to stimulate the industry of environmental protection development. Using the theory of incentive mechanism design, we analyze the formation of subsidy cheating and design an incentive mechanism which can cost least and restrain such problem in this paper. And then we draw a couple of conclusions that government should enforce the supervision in order to insure the efficiency of the subsidy.
subsidy cheating incentive mechanism design game analysis
Zhao Shuxin Ou Guoli
School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing, 100044, China
国际会议
烟台
英文
421-424
2010-08-06（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）