Game Analysis on Disputes of Rural Land Transfer between Peasants and Village Cadres in China
As representative of rural land ownership, village cadres are prefer to rent-seeking in the process of rural land transfer. Accordingly, peasants will do with rent-seeking behaviors of village cadres by different measures in different conditions. Based on Game Theory, characteristics of game behaviors between peasant and village cadre were discussed in this paper and the according results in different conditions (casel, case2, case3) were further analyzed. The results showed that if household tolerated the rent-seeking behavior of village cadre, it will inevitably lead to infringement of households rights and interests of rural land in case 1; If household resisted, then there were three possible game results in case 2 and 3: the first is reconciliation and settlement, the second is appeal and compensation, and the third is continuing toleration. But the final game result depends on determination and bargaining power of household. Finally, some proposals and measures on preventing and resolving disputes on rural land transfer were put forward from the perspective of fanners themselves, rural grassroots organizations, rural land transfer market and resolution mechanism of rural land disputes.
Rural land transfer Disputes on rural land Game analysis China
WANG Yanqi GUO Xiangyu
College of Economics and Management, Northeast Agricultural University, Harbin, P.R.China, 150030
国际会议
China Agriculture System Engineering Society 2010(2010年中国农业系统工程学术年会)
威海
英文
333-340
2010-07-29（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）