Game Analysis of hospital outsourcing prescription -Perspective on an benefit balance of all parties
For the phenomenon that preference of doctors prescribing outsourcing prescription results in expensive medical care, in this paper, with the game theory and methods, we analyzed the reason for the existence and operation rules of outsourcing prescription. The results showed that: The behavior of doctors prescribing outsourcing prescription can be controlled by increasing incentive on the regulators in the system, but to achieve the interest balance of all parties, we can only tolerate the behavior of prescribing outsourcing prescription of some doctors instead of eradicating totally. The conclusion has realistic reference value and direction significance on the hospital management in China at present.
outsourcing prescription, expensive medical care Hospital supervision Game
Li Zeng Xu Honghua Zhang Yan
School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology ,Xuzhou 221116, China
国际会议
南京
英文
25-30
2010-07-29（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）