Optimal Pareto Improvemeht of Cooperation Performance and the Effective Spectrums of Governance
Along with the enterprise refocusing process, the investment for exclusive purpose is increasingly demanded. On the contrary, the traditional theory implies that the integrated governance should be adapted to consolidate the Asset-Specificity. Based on the Mechanism Design Theory, and complied with the Participation Constraint /Incentive Compatibility Constraint /Promise Constraint, we have introduced two substitution variables, Asset-Specificity and Transaction-Relational Complexity, to the discussion on the price of Collaborative Rent and on the optimum value of Pareto Improvement upon the collaboration performance. Hereby we endeavour to prove the existence of optimum governance-genealogy range between the market and the bureaucracy. Besides, in the multiple Pareto Improvement equilibrium, the optimal solution of collaborative governance is superior to that of vertical integrated governance. The above fact proves that the collaboration allows for more improvement on the welfare than the vertical integration does.
asset-specificity destruction for the vertical integration collaborative governance quasi rent
MA Jun ZHANG Haomin
School of Management, Shanghai university, Shanghai, P.R.China, 200444
国际会议
威海
英文
145-150
2010-07-24（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）