Research on Selection of Supply Chain Partners under Information Asymmetry
This article, in order to overcome adverse selection problems in supply chain partner selection because of information asymmetry, based on mechanism design and revelation principles in game theory, and by applying the contract mechanism which can be used to encourage candidate partners to reveal their true types under the situation of information asymmetry, designed a payment contract model according to and for every type of candidate partner, which consists of three elements: basic fixed payment, reward and penalty. The outcomes show that, under some conditions, the candidate partners are willing to reveal their own true types, and different type candidate partners will not pretend themselves to be each other. It than obtained these conditions through solving the optimal solutions of the contracts. The article then, designed a payment contract model with zero payment to the poorly qualified candidate partners so as to exclude them in advance.
information asymmetry adverse selection payment contract
TANG Shiqiang
School of Management, Shanghai University of Engineering Science, Shanghai, P.R.China, 201620
国际会议
威海
英文
272-282
2010-07-24（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）