A game of profit division by slotting fees in supply chain
In addition to selling through the traditional supply chain of manufacturer and retailer, this paper discusses that manufacturer sales its product through both high-end retailer and low-end retailer. This paper use a Stackelberg game to explain the role of manufacturers paying slotting allowance to the high-end retailers. Based on the analysis of this case, this paper finds the results that paying slotting allowance to the high-end retailers is manufacturers marketing strategies for increasing its profits. And manufacturer is not intended to profit from the high-end market, but to advertise its products and give a guiding role of price.
game slotting fees supply chain manufacturer retailer
Yangpingyu Lijunyang
School of Management Shanghai University, SHU Shanghai, China School of Economics Shanghai University, SHU Shanghai, China
国际会议
成都
英文
23-26
2010-07-09（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）