Stackelberg Game-Theoretic Model with Stock-Dependent Demand and Private Information
This paper presents a model for analyzing the impact of private information on behaviors of supply chain members under the manufacturer-Stackelberg setting. The model consider a distribution system in which a manufacturer supplies a single product to a retailer, who faces a current-stock-level-dependent demand. This paper focuses on two aspects. First, under common information, we briefly discuss the two members centralized and decentralized decisions in the manufacturer-Stackelberg setting. Second, this paper contributes by analyzing how two parties behave under the manufacturer-Stackelberg scenario if they have private cost information. Some interesting results have been obtained.
two-echelon supply chain stock-dependent demand manufacturer-stackelberg private information
Jie Min Gui-Qing Liu
Department of Mathematics and physics Anhui University of Architecture Hefei, Peoples Republic of C School of Mathematics Hefei University of Technology Hefei, Peoples Republic of China
国际会议
成都
英文
563-567
2010-07-09（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）