Game Analysis and Prevention Mechanism for Food Quality Supervision Collusion
Food quality and safety supervision department plays a pivotal role for the quality assurance in entire food supply chain. But the food safety supervision agency is an economic man, in the case of asymmetric information with the lack of supervision, If the punishment is not strict, food safety supervision department with information superiority may collusion together with agents to deceive the client in order to maximize its own interests, it is a typical opportunistic behavior under conditions of information asymmetry. By utilizing the game theory, the tripartite game behaviors of the food manufacture, the supervisor and the food retailer were analyzed and discuss the approach to effective prevent collusions.
food quality collusion game model prevention mechnism supervision measures
Xin Ma Lu Shi
School of Management and Economic North China University of Water Conservancy and Electric Power Zhe School of Stomatology Zhengzhou University Zhengzhou, Henan Province, 450000, China
国际会议
成都
英文
283-287
2010-07-09（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）