Research on The Relationship Between Managerial Discretion And Monitoring Intensity: The Case in China
There are rather few scholars who have discussed the role of monitoring intensity both in the western countries and in China when managerial discretion is discussed. However, this paper proposes that managerial discretion and monitoring intensity are the two associated mechanisms and they are also relatively independent with each other, and the two mechanisms simultaneously determine the rationality and validity of the power allocation system inside the corporation. According to this paper, there is significant difference in corporate governance between the western countries and China, and the absence of monitoring is the sticking point during the reform of the State-owned Enterprises in China and the validity of the power allocation system inside the corporation is codetermined by managerial discretion and monitoring intensity. In China, the investigation on managerial discretion, monitoring intensity should not be ignored.
managerial discretion monitoring intensity stateowned enterprises corporate governance
Zhang Changzheng Jiang Xiaorong
School of Economics and Management Xian University of Technology Xian, China
国际会议
成都
英文
378-382
2010-07-09（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）