Supply Chain Coordination by Revenue Sharing and Effort Contracts
Under a revenue-sharing contract, the paper probes the main factors that affect the performance of supply chain, analyzes how to maintain the stability of the supply chain system. Considering a supply chain with a manufacturer and a distributor, based on game model, revenue sharing, contribute coefficient, innovation cost are discussed. The results indicate that the optimum effort varies directly with sharing coefficient and contribution coefficient, while varies inversely with the cost of innovate activity. The results also suggest the optimum sharing coefficient is relevant to contribute coefficient, innovation cost, but not significant to effort level. Comparing with Nash Equilibrium and Pareto Equilibrium, the article demonstrates that total revenue of supply chain in cooperative action strategy is less than non-cooperative. Besides, the effort level is also improved in cooperation strategy. For each member in supply chain, the member should determine their efforts, contribution and profit sharing proportion, and meanwhile they need to improve their core competitiveness. In addition, the members always asked for the purpose of collective overall profit
supply chain revenue sharing contracts coordination
G.P.Cheng W.Liu C.W.Xie B.L.Wang
School of Management Henan University of Technology Zhengzhou, China College of Economics and Management Henan Agricultural University Zhengzhou, China School of Management engineering Zhengzhou University Zhengzhou, China
国际会议
成都
英文
500-503
2010-07-09(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)