The Optimal Incentive Contract for a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based on Principal-Agent

摘要：

It is significant to coordinate interest distribution and improve the overall efficiency of closed-loop supply chain system. In this paper, we explore a two-level CLSCS comprised of a manufacturer and a retailer. Considering substitutability and uncertainty in closed-loop supply chain under information asymmetry condition, we propose a multi-task principal-agent model to maximize expected income of manufacturer and certainty equivalence income of retailer. Analysis results show the manufacturer will design incentive coefficients and the retailer will adjust effort levels according to risk-averse degree, external uncertainty and correlation coefficient of the marginal effort cost.

关键词： closed-loop supply chain multi-task principalagent incentive contract overall efficiency

作者: Wenqian LU

作者单位: Institute of Construction Project Management Hohai University Nanjing, P.R.China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2010 IEEE International Conference on Advanced Management Science(2010年IEEE高级管理科学国际会 IEEE ICAMS 2010)

会议地点: 成都

会议语种:英文

页码: 16-19

在线出版日期: 2010-07-09（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）